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Abstract
In this paper we examine whether the prospect of compulsory pro-
gramme participation motivates individuals to leave the unemployment
insurance (UI) system prior to participation. We analyze data from
the Danish labour market. Here a series of reforms have enforced pro-
gram participation and gradually restricted the duration of unemploy-
ment before individuals must enroll into programmes. However, there
is substantial heterogeneity in enrollment probabilities. If individuals
want to avoid participation and observe the heterogeneity in participa-
tion, this will also a⁄ect their search behaviour. We estimate a model
for anticipatory e⁄ects of participation, allowing for heterogeneity, on
search behaviour and ￿nd large signi￿cant e⁄ects from anticipation of
enrollment on the exit probability out of unemployment.
Keywords: Active Labour Market Measures, Hazard rates, unob-
served heterogeneity.
JEL Classi￿cations: C41, I21, J64
1 Introduction
In this paper we examine whether the prospect of compulsory labor market
program (LMP) participation motivates individuals to leave the unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) system prior to participation.
As a response to the high and sustained unemployment in the end of
the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s many countries invoked substantial
labour market reforms in that period. Most countries expanded their use of
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1LMPs considerably1 (Ger￿n and Lechner, 2002). Furthermore, some coun-
tries made UI bene￿t payments conditional on participation in any o⁄ered
LMP. This principle of compulsory LMP participation after some pre-de￿ned
duration of unemployment was in Europe ￿rst introduced by Denmark in
1994 and followed by Great Britain, Switzerland and Sweden (Ger￿n and
Lechner, 2002). The same principle is also in use in countries such as the
US and Australia (Black, 2003; Richardson, 2002).
The purpose of tying bene￿t payments to LMPs is twofold. First, par-
ticipation in a LMP may improve individuals￿quali￿cations and reintroduce
them to the labor market. Second, the compulsory aspect may provide an
new incentive for unemployed workers to look for and return to work (Jack-
man, 1994; Hansen and Tran￿s, 1999). The second e⁄ect, which we will
denote the ￿incentive e⁄ect￿ , is the topic of this study.
Various empirical studies have found that the prospect of termination
or reduction of bene￿ts results in a signi￿cant increased incentive for work
(Carling et al., 2001; Ham and Rea, 1987; Katz and Meyer, 1990; Meyer,
1990; Rogers, 1998). The prospect of compulsory program participation may
result in a similar incentive e⁄ect without the side e⁄ect of an income drop
for individuals who do not ￿nd employment. Such compulsory programs
may also be a relevant alternative to Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC)
programs as introduced in the US and the UK (Eissa and Liebman, 1996;
Blundell et al., 2000).
A potential incentive e⁄ect from LMP￿ s is highly dependent on the ex-
pected timing of enrollment into a LMP. In principle, the exact timing of
program participation is dictated by law. However, in reality unemployed
1By labor market programs, we refer to all sorts of programs with the intention of
improving the labor market skills of unemployed individuals and reacquaint them with
the labour market. Programs can be training programs or subsidized employment.
2individuals may have very di⁄erent risk of enrollment. There are various
reasons why this might be the case. Case workers may assess that some
individuals will gain less from program participation, or some types of pro-
grams may be in limited supply, thereby forcing case workers to select be-
tween individuals. Previous studies of the incentive e⁄ect have only looked
at the timing of LMPs as dictated by law (Geerdsen, 2003; and Black et al.,
2003).
In this paper we focus on individuals￿actual risk of enrolment in a LMP.
We do this by estimating individuals￿probability of participating in a LMP
as a function of demographics as well as time until LMP enrolment as dic-
tated by law. We apply the predicted probability in a model describing
individuals￿hazard of leaving UI unemployment. Finally, we also allow for
endogeneity in time until LMP enrolment as dictated by law as this depends
on the previous employment history.
In order to identify the incentive e⁄ect we use Danish register data on
individuals￿unemployment history supplied by Statistics Denmark. Since
1994 the entitlement period, in which individuals can receive UI bene￿ts
without participating in a labor market program, has been shortened. This
yields a quasi-experimental set up where the incentive e⁄ect of compulsory
program participation can be identi￿ed without functional form assump-
tions.
Our results indicate that the compulsory aspect of the Danish LMPs
motivates individuals to leave the UI system. The e⁄ect seems very strong
and in size comparable to e⁄ects found in studies of UI systems where in-
dividuals are at risk of loosing their right to bene￿ts all together (Meyer,
1990; Rogers, 1998). According to the estimation results the hazard out
of the UI system increases by up to 100 percent when compulsory program
3participation approaches.
The reminder of the paper is organized as the following. Section 2 gives
details on the labor market under study, section 3 present a model that
account for the intertemporal dynamics of the incentive e⁄ect, section 4
presents the data for the study, section 5 introduces an econometric model
for the incentive e⁄ect and section 6 gives the estimation results for this
model and ￿nally section 7 gives some concluding remarks.
2 Labor Market Programs and the Labor Market
in Denmark
The Danish UI system is a voluntary system where individuals can insure
themselves against the consequences of involuntary unemployment. Ap-
proximately 80-90 percent of the Danish workforce are members of the UI
system.2 Individuals who do not have UI is referred to means tested social
bene￿ts which in most cases is well below the level of the UI bene￿ts.
The Danish UI period is divided into two sub periods - a ￿ passive￿period
and an ￿ activation￿period3. Unemployed individuals ￿rst enter the passive
period. In this period they are generally left to their own job search. The
passive period is followed by the activation period. In this period individuals
have to participate in a LMP in order to receive bene￿ts. Rejecting to
participate in a LMP will in initially result in a quarantine from the UI
system and eventually a dismissal all together.4
The passive period was initially set to 4 years and the activation period
was set to 3 years. This meant that individuals could stay unemployed and
2First time entitlement to enter the danish UI system requires 12 months of consequtive
employment.
3This system was introduced in 1994. Before 1994, individuals who were eligible for
UI bene￿ts could, when unemployed, receive bene￿ts for up to 9 years.
4Individuals who have been dismissed from the UI system have to regain the right to
the system in the same way as other individuals without access to the UI system.
4receive bene￿ts for up to 7 years. The passive period has been shortened.
From mid 1996, individuals who gained or regained the right to a fresh UI
period were only entitled to a 2 year passive period. For all other individuals,
the passive period was shortened to 3 years in mid 1996 and further to 2
years in 1998. The activation period has had an unchanged duration of 3
years since 1994.
The LMPs o⁄ered in the activation period consist of a wide variety of
options. The programmes can be divided into the following categories:
￿ Subsidized employment in a private or public ￿rm
￿ Labour market training
￿ Assistance with self-employment
Individuals in both public and private subsidized employment receive the
minimum wage set by collective bargaining in the given sector. The working
hours for individuals in public subsidized employment are restricted so that
the wage income does not surpass the maximum bene￿t level. Individuals in
private subsidized employment can have normal working hours and thereby
have an income higher than maximum bene￿t level. Individuals in train-
ing programmes receive income equal to the bene￿ts they received prior to
starting in the labour market programme. Between 1994 and 1998 individ-
uals could also receive economic support for self-employment. The support
could not surpass the maximum bene￿t level.
Due to the long durations of the bene￿ts period, individuals only rarely
use up all of their bene￿t months. Most often individuals regain the right to
a fresh UI period before they run out of bene￿ts. The eligibility requirement
was up to mid 1996 half a year of unsupported employment within a 3 year
5period. After mid 1996, the requirement was changed to 1 year of unsup-
ported employment within a 3 year period. If individuals have not regained
the right to a fresh UI period between two unemployment spells, the previ-
ous spell is included in individuals￿seniority in the UI period. This means
that two individuals who begin an unemployment spell at the same time can
very well have di⁄erent seniority in the UI period and hence (by law) di⁄er-
ent risk of being enrolled in a LMP. In the following we will denote this as
"passive period entitlement" (PPE) describing how many months individu-
als have left until entering the activation period when their unemployment
spell commence.
3 A Model for E⁄ects of Active Measures on Search
In this section we propose a model for interpreting the e⁄ect of compulsory
enrollment into LMPs. The model analyses the search behavior of unem-
ployed possibly looking for employment and facing potential enrollment into
a LMP. The purpose of the model is to characterize the situations in which
we should expect an incentive e⁄ect from compulsory LMPs.
The model covers three time-periods. A pre-enrollment period, a pe-
riod of potential participation in LMP, and a post enrollment period. In
period one, the agent in the model is unemployed. In period two there
are three possible states, continued unemployment, enrollment into LMP or
employment. In period three there is only employment and unemployment.
In period one and two the unemployed must decide on the amount of job-
search. Job-search a⁄ects the probability of employment in the following
period. Job-search is possible in all three states.
Finally, given the amount of job-search, there are state speci￿c transition
probabilities of moving between states in period two (employment, unem-
6ployment and LMP) and period three (employment and unemployment).
The agent has a state speci￿c utility function, which also depends on the
amount of job-search, expect for period three where there is no job-search.
There are two immediate consequences of being in an LMP in the model.
One is that the contemporaneous utility in period two might di⁄er from that
of being unemployed e.g. if the unemployed has a preference of doing the
type of activity associated with active labour market measures or that it
might be considered unpleasant to be forced to spend time in an mandatory
measure compared to be unemployed. The other is, that transition prob-
abilities of moving into employment in period three might di⁄er between
unemployment and LMP in period two because of some kind of stigmati-
zation e⁄ect from being enrolled into active measures. Formerly our model
is:

































2)ul and ￿t;t = 1;2 is the level of
job-search in period t, uj(￿);j = a;u;e is the utility of occupying state
unemployment (u), activation (a) or employment (e) respectively in period
one and two. We assume utility in all states to be negatively related to





j(￿) < 0;u;j = a;u;e. We allow for the possibility of state speci￿c
search levels, ￿2 = ￿e
2;￿u
2;￿a
2, in period two. As there is no job search in
period three, the utility in period three, uj;j = u;e does not depend on
job-search. p
t;t+1
jl (￿);t = 1;2 are the transition probabilities from state j to
l between period t and t+1: The transition probability from unemployment
and LMP to employment depends on job search activity by: pje = pj(￿);j =
7u;a, with p0(￿) > 0;p00(￿) < 0.5 Furthermore, given non-employment in
period two, the probability of being enrolled into a LMP in this period is
pa. Hence, the probability of being unemployed in period two is the residual
probability from not being enrolled in a LMP, conditional of being non-
employed: p12
uu = (1 ￿ pa)(1 ￿ p(￿)).
The model is strictly recursive, with optimal decisions on search levels in










2) = 0;j = e;u;a, indepen-
dent of optimal decisions in period one and pa. Now di⁄erentiate the period






























uj(2) = @puj(2)=@￿;j = e;a;u. On equating (1) to zero an solving for























































b ￿1 de￿nes an maximum and otherwise a minimum.
When b ￿1 is a maximum, increasing values of pa leads to increasing
values of b ￿1 (as the left hand side of (2) is decreasing in ￿1) when ever
5We could think of pj(￿) being the probability of being o⁄ered a job from a degenerated




2) > e Va(b ￿
a
2). Hence, whenever unemployment in period two is pre-
ferred to LMP, increasing enrollment in LMP will yield increased search
behavior in period one. As mentioned above we may have e Vu(b ￿
u
2) > e Va(b ￿
a
2)
for several reasons. One is that uu(b ￿
u
2) > ua(b ￿
a
2), disutility from LMP,
given the optimal search levels in period two for the two states. Another






2), together with ue > uu, stigmatization
from LMP and employment is preferred in period three to unemployment.6
The ￿rst reason (disutility from LMP participation) applies to both individ-
uals whom, in period three, prefer to stay unemployed as well as employed,
where as the second (stigmatization) only applies to those who prefer em-
ployment to unemployment in period three.
When b ￿1is a minimum it is equal to in￿nity and V 1(￿1;￿2) attains its
maximum at the lower bound of the support of ￿1(no search in period one,
voluntary unemployment). When no search is optimal it must be because
the unemployed has optimal values of unemployment or LMP compared to
employment in period two for all values of search. It is interesting to note
that in this case, when e Vu(b ￿
u
2) > e Va(b ￿
a
2), increasing values of pa might
shift the characteristic of b ￿1 from a minimum to a maximum, thus shifting
optimal search from its lower bound to the new value of b ￿1.7 This is because
even though the agent prefer unemployment to employment, LMP might be
so perceived so unpleasant, that the unemployed, facing high enrollment
probability into LMP, might ￿nd search for employment to escape LMP
to yield higher expected utility than the prospect of having a high risk of
moving into LMP. Hence even in the case of voluntary unemployment, LMP
6Note that disutility is given the optimal search level in period two. This means that
disutility from LMP compared to unemployment might arise because optimal search is
more costly within LMP than from unemployment, perhaps because employment is harder




2 )￿e Va(b ￿a
2))￿e Vu(b ￿u
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@pa < 0 for e Vu(b ￿
u
2) > e Va(b ￿
a
2) and for
su¢ ciently large values of pa this might chance the sign of the expression in the brackets.
9might induce the unemployed to increase job search prior to moving into
LMP.
The model illustrates the conditions under which we might expect un-
employed to increase search activity and thereby having an increased un-
employment to employment transition when facing increasing likelihood of
enrollment into active measures. These are less contemporaneous utility
from being in active measures compared to being unemployed and/or lower
employment opportunities when being in active measures compares to being
unemployed conditional on employment being preferred to unemployed. The
￿rst condition induce both voluntary as well as involuntary unemployed to
increase job-search, while the latter only make involuntary unemployment
to increase job-search.
4 Data
The data used in this analysis are collected by di⁄erent public bodies and
supplied by Statistics Denmark. Based entirely on registers, there is no
non-response in our data.
In our analysis below we have used weekly observations on UI-bene￿ts
recipients collected by the UI system. We have also used demographic infor-
mation, from di⁄erent population registers supplied by Statistics Denmark.
The analysis is performed on a balanced 10 percent sample of the popula-
tion for the period 1995 to 1998. In order to obtain a homogenous sample
of unemployed facing identical conditions on the labour market, we have
further restricted the sample to male individuals who were between 25 and
47 years of age in 1994, who has full passive period entitlement (PPE), when
they enter the sample (fresh spells) and who become unemployed during the
sample period. See Geerdsen (2003) for details.
10Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variables min max mean st.dev.
Spouse=1 59.89
University degree 14.62
Age 26.00 51.00 36.69 6.79
Spell length 0.53 46.40 3.27 4.32
No. of spell per ind. 1.00 13.00 2.38 1.49
PPE when spell commence -18.03 48.00 32.57 12.43
Note: Number of individuals=6,547. Number of spells=15,583. Number of
fresh spells=8,575. Number of right censored spells=1,047.
Our spell measure is monthly observations and in order to construct the
UI spells for the analysis, we have assumed that a spell consists of minimum
2 weeks of unemployment within a month. A spell is broken if an individual
is not receiving bene￿ts for more than 2 weeks in a month.8
In Table 1, the sample is described. A total of 6,547 individuals appear
in the sample. These individuals have a total of 15,583 UI spells between
1995 and 1998. A little more than half of these spells are ￿fresh￿ spells,
meaning that the right to a new UI period has been gained or regained
prior to unemployment. Individuals do on average have a little more than
2 unemployment spells in the sample period and the average duration of a
spell is a little longer than 3 months. On average individuals commencing
an unemployment spell have approximately 33 months of passive period
entitlement (PPE) left before they enter the activation period.
If the prospect of compulsory LMPs indeed stimulate individuals to leave
the UI system, this may be visible in standard Kaplan Meyer estimates.
Furthermore, the shortening of the passive period, and hence advance of the
activation period, in mid 1996 may also advance individuals￿reaction to the
LMPs. In Figure 1 individuals￿hazard of leaving the UI system is displayed
8We do not have information on exit state of the individual. However, by restricting
the analysis to males in the age group 25 to 47 years the overwhelming number of spells
in the analysis ends in employment.

























Spells commencing before mid 1996 Spells commencing after mid 1996
for spells commencing before and after mid 1996.
The Kaplan Meyer estimates give strong indications of a positive incen-
tive e⁄ect. First of all, the hazard out of the UI system displays a steep
increase which is located approximately when individuals at the latest enter
the activation period. Second, this steep increase after a shorter duration for
spells commencing after mid 1996. This may be a result of the advancement
of the activation period.
Another question is whether individuals are actually enrolled a LMP
when they enter the activation period. Figure 2 shows the fraction of unem-
ployed individuals enrolled in LMPs as a function of their seniority in the
UI period. The ￿gure displays di⁄erent educational groups of unemployed
in our sample.
From the ￿gure two important characteristics of the enrollment into
LMPs becomes clear. First, there is by no means a deterministic relation-
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Skilled and further educ. Unskilled
ship between entering the activation period and actually being enrolled in a
LMP.9 Second, the probability of enrollment is highly heterogenous between
di⁄erent groups of unemployed. 22 percent of unemployed individuals who
are skilled or have a further education are in a LMP when the passive period
runs out. For unskilled individuals the share is only 17 percent. Enrollment
rises to 38 percent ￿ve month into the activation period for skilled unem-
ployed or unemployed with further education compared to only 22 percent
for unskilled at this point. If unemployed individuals know this, and use this
to determine their search behavior, then time until the activation period is a
very poor measure of the incentive e⁄ect of LMPs on search behavior prior
to moving into such measures.
9The reason that some unemployed are in ALMP before entitlement is exhausted is that
if unemployed did show no job-search activity at all, case managers at the unemployment
agencies was entitled to o⁄er ALMP to these individuals. Non-compliance in this case
induced a 20 % reduction in bene￿ts.
135 The Econometric Model
In this section we propose an econometric model of the incentive e⁄ect of
LMPs on job-search. The model captures the characteristics of the model
outlined in section 3, as well as the characteristics of the actual labor market
under study.
As demonstrated above, the likelihood of moving into LMPs depends
very much on individual characteristics. By accounting for individual char-
acteristics as well as passive period entitlement (PPE),10 we approximate
the expected hazard rate of being enrolled in a LMP, as perceived by the
unemployed. We then include this estimated hazard rate as an explanatory
variable in the hazard rate into regular employment.
The model also takes into account the potential endogeneity of PPE.
Those with long PPE￿ s when entering a spell of unemployment might also
have unobserved characteristics that indicate a high probability of entering
employment. This is because a large PPE indicate more employment be-
tween unemployment spells compared to a shorter PPE. If we do not take
this into account, we would infer that those with large PPEs have higher
employment probabilities, and hence exercise more active job-search, than
those with shorter entitlement. This is contrary to what a potential incen-
tive e⁄ect from PPE￿ s might indicate. Hence, if PPE enters as an exogenous
variable in the enrollment hazard, it will have less predictive power on job-
search than if treated properly as an endogenous variable.
Finally, the complete model also needs to take into account unobserved
e⁄ects by allowing correlated random e⁄ects between the two hazard rate
10Note that our sample is a random sample of individuals with maximum PPE. However,
once individuals are sampled, they stay in the sample. Hence, when they have multiple
spells of unemployment, consecutive spells do not necessarily have maximum PPE. If
we only included individuals when they have regained maximum PPE, we would select
individuals out of the sample according to a potential endogenous measure.
14models and the model capturing PPE. Identi￿cation of the e⁄ect of the
expected hazard rate into LMPs on the hazard rate into employment rest
partly on the timing of events result in Abbring and van den Berg (2003),
and traditional instrumental variables methods (the cut in PPE in 1996).
By including the 1996 advancement of the activation period in the model
for PPE when spells commence, we obtain an non-parametric identi￿cation
of the e⁄ect of entitlement on the hazard rate into a LMP. Note that the
identi￿cation of the parameters of distribution of the random e⁄ects is also
facilitated by the presence of multiple spells for most of the individuals in
the sample, van den Berg (2002).
Formerly our model goes like this: First part of the simultaneous model
describes PPE (y) measured in months, at the start of an unemployment
spell. Observed PPE has a maximum11 that varies as policy changes through
the sample period (the cut in mid 1996). We therefore suggest at tobit model
for the observed entitlement according to:
y = y￿;y￿ < c
y = c;y￿ ￿ c
where y￿ is a latent PPE12 if there where no ceiling on PPE and c is maxi-
mum PPE. The model for the latent PPE is:
y￿ = ￿yxy + ey + ";
where xy are characteristics of the unemployed when PPE began accumulat-
ing, ey is a random e⁄ect capturing unobserved variables and " is an idiosyn-
cratic error term being normally distributed with zero mean and variance
￿2.
11As mentioned in section 4, PPE is dependent on previous employment and unemploy-
ment. When maximum PPE is obtained, through a su¢ ciently ammount of employment
(12 months), employment over and above this does not contribute to the length of PPE.
12I.e. indicating employment over and above that reqiured to obtain maximum PPE.
15The next part of the model describes the probability of moving into
a LMP during a spell of unemployment. In continuos time we propose a
proportional hazard rate model of being enrolled into active measures during
a spell of unemployment:
￿(t;xa(t);￿a) = exp(Qa(t))exp(￿y + ￿axa(t) + ￿a)
where Qa(t) capture the time-dependence of the unemployment spell on the
hazard of moving into LMPs through a polynomial in elapsed unemploy-
ment duration. xa(t) is a vector of, possibly time varying, characteristics of
the unemployed and ￿a is a random e⁄ect capturing the e⁄ect of unobserved
characteristics of the unemployed. The corresponding discrete time proba-
bility (hazard) of leaving employment during an interval of length tl ￿ tl￿1



















By assuming that xa(t) is constant within intervals we further get:
￿a(tjxa(t);￿a) = 1￿exp
 





= 1￿exp(￿exp(￿a(tl) + ￿y + ￿axa(tl) + ￿a))
= F (￿a(tl;tl￿1)+￿y + ￿axa(tl) + ￿a) = Fa(tl); (3)
where ￿a(tl;tl￿1) =
R tl
tl￿1 exp(Qa(s))ds and F(x) = 1 ￿ exp(￿exp(x)).
In similar manner we get the discrete time hazard rate of entering em-
ployment, capturing the incentive e⁄ect by conditioning this hazard rate on










tl is a binary indicator variable equal to one when in active measures
in time interval tl;tl￿1, and 0 otherwise.13 xe(tl) and ￿e are de￿ned similar
to the model for moving into a LMP. To construct the likelihood for n
individuals each with ￿i;i = 1;:::n, spells of unemployment, we need to
specify the joint distribution of unobserved heterogeneity from the three
di⁄erent parts of the model. We do this by assuming that they are all
discrete with a ￿nite number of points of support, eyj;eaj;eej;j = 1;:::;J
and that each point of support has a common probability, wj, associated
with it. This is a common assumption when allowing for random e⁄ects in
duration model, see e.g. (van den Berg 2002). Similarly to ya
tl we de￿ne
binary indicator of employment, ye







































where ￿(:) denotes the standard normal density, superscript j of "j;Faj(tl)
and Fej(tl) indicate conditioning of the actual value of the j￿ th point of
support for the distribution of the random e⁄ects. Maximization of lnL
13Indivuduals leave the data when they either move into employment or out of a LMP
(right censored - if not employed).
17yields the mle￿ s of the parameters of the model:
￿;￿a;￿1;￿2;￿e;￿;eyj;eaj;eej;wj;j = 1;:::;J
and the parameters of Qe(tl) and Qa(tl). The parameter for the incentive
e⁄ect of LMP on the job-hazard, ￿2, is our parameter of interest.
6 Results
The estimation result of the model described in section 5 is described in the
following Tables. Table 2a shows results for the estimation of the passive
period entitlement (PPE) when individuals unemployment spell commence.
From Table 2a we ￿nd that older individuals and individuals living alone has
the shortest PPE when entering an unemployment spell. Also, it appears
that especially individuals with long further education has a signi￿cantly
lower PPE than other unemployed individuals.
Table 2a. Estimation results.
Passive period entitlement when spell
commence.
Variable Coe¢ cient Sd. error
Constant 53:758 * 0:380
Age ￿0:033 * 0:009
Couple 1:192 * 0:125
Unskilled
Up.Sec. ￿0:034 0:408
Vocational 0:606 * 0:139
Short furth. ￿0:082 0:338
Int. furth. ￿0:211 0:336
Long furth. ￿0:966 * 0:322
No educ. inf. ￿0:811 * 0:258
1996 ￿1:820 * 0:233
1997 ￿3:173 * 0:310
1998 ￿12:317 * 0:312
June 1996 ￿20:916 * 0:247
￿ 6:583 * 0:008
Note: ￿ is the estimated standard error of the error term.
* denotes signi￿cance at a 5% level.
18Table 2b. Estimation results.
Probability of being in a LMP.
Variable Coe¢ cient Std. error
Constant ￿7:224 * 0:323
t 0:469 * 0:042
t2 ￿0:015 * 0:005
t3 3:109E ￿ 4 2:309E ￿ 04
t4 ￿2:76E ￿ 06 3:23E ￿ 06
PPE ￿0:026 * 0:004
Age ￿0:015 * 0:005
Unskilled
Up.Sec 0:670 * 0:140
Vocational 0:270 * 0:095
Short furth. 0:618 * 0:142
Int. furth. 0:780 * 0:160
Long furth. ￿0:033 * 0:128
No educ. inf. 0:153 * 0:127
Couple 0:422 * 0:062
1996 ￿0:050 * 0:089
1997 ￿0:196 * 0:124
1998 0:306 0:155
* is signi￿cant at 5% level.
This indicates that these individuals have less employment than other
individuals, since PPE is a function on employment history. We also ￿nd
that spells which start later, during the estimation period, have shorter
PPE than those from earlier on. This could be a selection e⁄ect. During
the economic upturn, those who have predominantly short unemployment
spells (over and above that implied by time invariant random e⁄ects) are to
lesser degree unemployed in the last part of the estimation period. Finally,
we ￿nd, very much as expected, that PPE is very much shortened by the
shortening of the passive period in mid 1996. In summary, we ￿nd that
PPE is highly dependent on observed and unobserved (see Table 2d below)
individual characteristics as well as formal rules for entitlement.
Results for estimating the transition into a LMP is shown in Table 2b.
19From Table 2b we ￿nd that unemployed with spouses as well as younger
individuals are more likely to be enrolled into a LMP. This also holds for in-
dividuals with vocational education as well as short and intermediate further
education. So, those who has characteristics implying a high probability of
enrollment into a LMP, appear also to be individuals with long expected
PPE (Table 2a). But we also ￿nd that the shorter the PPE, the more likely
one is to be in a LMP, indicated by the signi￿cant negative estimate of PPE.
Furthermore, we ￿nd that in the later part of the estimation period, there is
a higher probability of moving into a LMP over and above that implied by
the PPE and changes in the PPE indicating a more strict enrollment policy
from the unemployment agencies. Finally, we ￿nd a clear positive duration
dependence on the probability of enrollment, implied by the parameters of
the time polynomial.
Results for estimating the transition into employment are shown in Table
2c. From Table 2c we ￿nd that the transition rate into employment exhibits
negative duration dependence. Furthermore younger individuals and indi-
viduals with a spouse are more likely to move out of unemployment. Hence
it seems that those with the observed characteristics leading to the high-
est transition rate into employment also tend to be those with the highest
probabilities of being in a LMP. When it comes to education, we ￿nd that
especially individuals with a vocational education have a higher hazard out
of unemployment than the reference group (the unskilled). As we saw above,
individuals with a vocational education also have the lowest hazard of en-
tering a LMP (apart from unskilled) and the largest PPE compared to all
other educational groups.
20Table 2c. Estimation results.
Hazard rate into employment.
Variable Coe¢ cient Sd. error
Constant ￿0:249 * 0:063
t ￿0:238 * 0:016
t2 0:012 * 0:002
t3 3:201E ￿ 4 * 1:183E ￿ 4
t4 3:65E ￿ 6 * 1:75E ￿ 6
Age ￿0:006 * 0:001
Unskilled - -
Up.Sec ￿0:239 * 0:065
Vocational 0:085 * 0:023
Short furth. ￿0:149 * 0:054
Int. furth. ￿0:159 * 0:053
Long furth. ￿0:246 * 0:053
No educ. inf. ￿0:415 * 0:042
Couple 0:228 * 0:020
1996 ￿0:116 * 0:031
1997 ￿0:108 * 0:031
1998 0:016 * 0:032
￿1 ￿0:053 0:114
￿2 1:483 * 0:232
Note: ￿1 is equal to 1 if the individual is in a LMP.
￿2 is the probability of being in a LMP for individuals .
who are not in a LMP. * is signi￿cance at the
5% level.
Finally, we ￿nd that being in a LMP (￿1) does not a⁄ect the transition
rate out of unemployment signi￿cantly, but that the probability of being
in a LMP, the incentive e⁄ect, (￿2) has substantial positive impact on the
probability of moving out of unemployment. The magnitude of this e⁄ect is
depicted in Figure 4. This ￿gure also capture the duration dependence of
the probability of being in a LMP.14
From the ￿gure we see that during the spell of unemployment, the odds
ratio of moving out of unemployment with incentive e⁄ect is increasing com-
14The enrollment probability and the job-hazard is calculated for an unskilled, living
alone, of 35 years of age and with 12 months PPE when entering unemployment. Further-
more, we assume the person in the calculations to have average unobserved characteristics
both in terms of enrollment as well as in terms of the job-hazard.







































































Enrollment prob. Job-hazard, right axsis Job-hazard with incentive effect, right axsis
pared to a situation with no incentive e⁄ect and after three years of unem-
ployment the odds ratio is more than two. Hence, especially for long term
unemployed, the incentive e⁄ect seems quite important.
In Table 2d we ￿nally show results for the discrete distribution of random
e⁄ects. From table 2d we see that individuals with a low component for
the transition into employment (ue) is associated with a low probability of
being in a LMP (ua) and less PPE at the outset of their unemployment
spell (e). This means that the adverse characteristics holds for the reference
groups. Hence, it seems that unobserved characteristics associated with high
probability of moving out of unemployment is associated with a relatively
low probability of being in a LMP and relatively long entitlement.
22Table 2d. Estimation results.
Distribution of random e⁄ects.









Note: e is individual error term for the PPE.
ua is individual error term for probability of LMP
participation. ue is individual error term for
the hazard out of unemployment.
Therefore, according to the distribution of random e⁄ects, there are in-
dividuals which have a high transition rate into employment, yet has a very
low probability of moving into a LMP, irrespective of their entitlement.
Hence, this group do, apparently, not seem to behave as predicted by the
incentive e⁄ect, because they have an extremely low enrollment probability.
However, this is due to unobserved characteristics. Without the random
e⁄ects included in the model, we would erroneously have estimated a lower
incentive e⁄ect, because a large fraction of the sample would have a higher
predicted incentive e⁄ect that they did not behave accordingly to.
7 Conclusion
The results of this paper clearly indicates that the prospect of compulsory
LMP participation incite individuals to leave the UI system prior to par-
ticipation. We ￿nd that this e⁄ect is very strong. When the risk of being
enrolled in a LMP is at it highest, individuals respond with more than a
100 percent increase in the hazard of leaving UI unemployment. The size
of this e⁄ect is comparable with the e⁄ect found in studies of individuals
23reaction to the prospect of bene￿t exhaustion (Meyer, 1990; Rogers, 1998).
This indicates that it is indeed possible to obtain the strong incentive e⁄ects
which the loss of bene￿ts will in￿ ict, without a substantial income drop for
individuals who cannot ￿nd employment.
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